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Seventy-second session
Agenda item 121
Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly

Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report has been prepared in accordance with paragraph 5 (d) of the annex to General Assembly resolution 58/316. It contains the draft programme of work of the plenary for the seventy-third session of the General Assembly. The draft programmes of work of five of the six Main Committees of the Assembly, which were approved by the Assembly, can be found in the respective decisions of the Assembly. The status of documentation will be issued as an addendum to the present report.

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I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, in paragraph 5 (d) of the annex to its resolution 58/316 on further measures for the revitalization of the work of the Assembly, decided that in July of each year the General Committee would conduct a review of the proposed programme of work for the forthcoming session of the Assembly, on the basis of a report submitted by the Secretary-General, and would also submit recommendations on the matter to the Assembly at its forthcoming session. The report would include information on the status of documentation to be issued during the forthcoming session.

2. The present report has been prepared in response to that request.

3. The draft programmes of work of the Main Committees, with the exception of the Fifth Committee,[1] have been approved by the respective Committees and were adopted by the General Assembly in the following decisions: First Committee (decision 72/516); Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) (decision 72/521); Second Committee (decision 72/544); Third Committee (decision 72/536); and Sixth Committee (decision 72/528).

4. With a view to assisting the General Committee and the General Assembly in their efforts to maximize both effectiveness and efficiency, the present report contains the draft programme of work of the plenary for the seventy-third session. The draft programmes of the Main Committees are available in the respective decisions.

5. The status of documentation will be issued as an addendum to the present report.

II. Draft programme of work of the plenary for the seventy-third session of the General Assembly

First week (18–21 September)

Tuesday, 18 September p.m.	Opening of the session by the President of the General Assembly [1][2]
	Minute of silent prayer or meditation [2]
	Appointment of the members of the Credentials Committee [3 (a)]
Wednesday, 19 September	Meeting of the General Committee
Friday, 21 September	Organization of work, adoption of the agenda and allocation of items: first report of the General Committee [7]

[1] The Fifth Committee has not taken a decision on this matter.

[2] Items and their numbers cited herein are from the preliminary list of items to be included in the provisional agenda of the seventy-third session (A/73/50). All items are pending approval by the General Assembly at its seventy-third session for their inclusion in the agenda and allocation for consideration. Some items that are on the preliminary list but not reflected in this draft programme are omitted either in accordance with relevant resolutions and decisions of the Assembly or for scheduling at a later date.

Second week (24–28 September)	
Monday, 24 September 9.30 a.m.	Peacebuilding and sustaining peace [67]: Nelson Mandela Peace Summit (resolution 72/243)
Tuesday, 25 September to Saturday, 29 September	General debate [8][3]
Third week (1–5 October)	
Monday, 1 October	General debate [8]
Fourth week (8–12 October)	
	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Monday, 8 October	Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization [110]
	[Promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and recent United Nations conferences; Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Wednesday, 10 October	1. Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields [15]; Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit [117]; Strengthening of the United Nations system [123 (a) and (b)]; United Nations reform: measures and proposals [124]: *joint debate*
	2. Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit [117]: specific meeting focused on development (resolution 60/265)
	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Friday, 12 October	Election of members of the Human Rights Council [114 (d)]
Fifth week (15–19 October)	
	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Wednesday, 17 October p.m.	International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals [129]
	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]

[3] As the first item before the opening of the general debate, the Secretary-General will present his report on the work of the Organization.

Thursday, 18 October	Impact of rapid technological change on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals [133]
	[Development of Africa; Promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and recent United Nations conferences]
Friday, 19 October	New Partnership for Africa's Development: progress in implementation and international support [68 (a) and (b)]; 2001–2010: Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa [14]: *joint debate*
Sixth week (22–26 October)	
Wednesday, 24 October	*United Nations Day Concert*
	[Promotion of justice and international law]
Thursday, 25 October	Report of the International Court of Justice [76]
	[Promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and recent United Nations conferences]
Friday, 26 October	Space as a driver of sustainable development [31]
Seventh week (29 October–2 November)	
	[Promotion of justice and international law]
Monday, 29 October	Report of the International Criminal Court [77]
	[Maintenance of international peace and security]
Wednesday, 31 October	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba [43]
	[Promotion of human rights]
Thursday, 1 November	Report of the Human Rights Council [69]
Eighth week (5–9 November)	
	[Promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and recent United Nations conferences]
Monday, 5 November	Report of the Economic and Social Council [9]; Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields [15]: *joint debate*
	[Disarmament]

Friday, 9 November	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency [90]
Ninth week (12–16 November)	
	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Monday, 12 November	Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council [122]
	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Wednesday, 14 November	1. Appointment of members of the Joint Inspection Unit [115 (f)]
	2. Appointment of the judges of the United Nations Appeals Tribunal [115 (i)]
	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Thursday, 15 November	Implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations [120]; Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly [121]: *joint debate*
Tenth week (19–23 November)	
	[Maintenance of international peace and security]
Monday, 19 November	The situation in Afghanistan [40]
	[Promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and recent United Nations conferences; Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Wednesday, 21 November	1. Sport for development and peace [12]
	2. Commemoration of the abolition of slavery and the transatlantic slave trade [119]
Eleventh week (26–30 November)	
	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Monday, 26 November	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations [126 (a) to (y)]: *joint debate*
	[Maintenance of international peace and security]
Thursday, 29 November p.m. to Friday, 30 November a.m. and p.m.	1. Question of Palestine [39]
	2. The situation in the Middle East [38]

Twelfth week (3–7 December)

[Organizational, administrative and other matters]

Monday, 3 December

Investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjöld and of the members of the party accompanying him [130]

Thirteenth week (10–17 December)

[Promotion of justice and international law]

Tuesday, 11 December

Oceans and the law of the sea [78 (a) and (b)]: *joint debate*

[Promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and recent United Nations conferences]

Wednesday, 12 December

1. Return or restitution of cultural property to the countries of origin [10]
2. Culture of peace [16]
3. The role of the United Nations in promoting a new global human order [17]

[Organizational, administrative and other matters]

Thursday, 13 December

Global health and foreign policy [128]

[Effective coordination of humanitarian assistance efforts]

Friday, 14 December

Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance [75 (a) to (c)]: *joint debate*

Monday, 17 December

Report of the Credentials Committee [3 (b)]

Prevention of armed conflict [35 (a) and (b)]: *joint debate*

Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic [37]

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan [41]

Election of members of the Committee for Programme and Coordination [114 (a)]

Election of members of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [114 (b)]

Election of members of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission [114 (c)]

Appointment of members of the Committee on Conferences [115 (e)]

Appointment of the judges of the United Nations Dispute Tribunal [115 (h)]

(17 December: end of 13 weeks)

Plenary items not scheduled for consideration during the main part of the session

Election of the President of the General Assembly [4]

Election of the Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly [6]

Implementation of the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and the political declarations on HIV/AIDS [11]

Report of the Security Council [32]

Report of the Peacebuilding Commission [33]; Peacebuilding and sustaining peace [67]; Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund [111]: *joint debate*

The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict [34]

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development [36]

Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations [112]

Election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council [113 (a)][4]

Election of eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council [113 (b)][4]

Appointment of members of the Board of the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns [115 (g)]

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy [118]

Multilingualism [125]

Plenary items not scheduled for consideration during the seventy-third session, as their inclusion in the provisional agenda of the seventy-third session is subject to any action the Assembly may take on them at its seventy-second session

Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 [88]

Sexual exploitation and abuse: implementing a zero-tolerance policy [131]

The responsibility to protect and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity [132]

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[4] The General Assembly, in its resolution 68/307, decided to conduct the elections of the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members of the Economic and Social Council about six months before the elected members assume their responsibilities, beginning at the seventieth session.

United Nations A/72/887–S/2018/517

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 37
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Identical letters dated 29 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you that on 22 May 2018, an Israeli warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the city of Beirut. The Israeli Government flaunted that violation by displaying photographs of the combat aircraft on 22 May 2018 at a conference of air force commanders held in Israel. The photographs were also published in the Israeli media (please find annexed a copy of an article in the *Haaretz* newspaper).

Lebanon strongly condemns this fresh violation of Lebanese airspace, which constitutes yet another flagrant violation of Lebanese sovereignty, the Charter of the United Nations, the provisions of international law, and international resolutions, in particular Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). Lebanon stresses that it will maintain its legitimate right to defend its sovereign territory, airspace and waters in the face of any Israeli attack. Lebanon calls upon the Security Council to condemn this hostile action in the strongest possible terms and take all measures needed to deter Israel from continuing to commit serious violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon by land, sea and air.

Lebanon will never cease to call upon the Security Council, and through the Council the international community, to apply the forceful pressure needed to make Israel halt is acts of aggression and comply with and implement fully and without delay all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006). The continued violation of Lebanese airspace, occupation of Lebanese territory and commission of acts of aggression by Israel constitute a blatant violation of international law and internationally authoritative resolutions, and threaten regional and international security and peace.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Amal **Mudallali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 29 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

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Analysis // Iran, Israel and an F-35 Over Beirut: The Fine Line Between Deterrence and Hubris

Israel's publication of the dramatic photo of the F-35 above Lebanon had some embarrassing side effects

Amos Harel | May 28, 2018 5:50 AM

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A message of superiority: This is the Israeli army's photo of an F-35 over Beirut Credit: Israel Television News Company / Screenshot

- **With Trump at his back, Netanyahu feels invincible. But reality may soon come crashing down**
- **Syria: Military airport near Homs was subject to 'missile aggression'**
- **Hamas in Gaza, Iranians in Syria: Israel's F-35 strikes carried message to both enemies and allies**

With U.S. President Donald Trump at its side and following a series of military gains in the north, Israel is zigzagging irresponsibly on the boundary between deterrence and arrogance. This behavior is not surprising when it comes to politicians. Certainly not in regard to Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz who, like a dyed-in-the-wool internet commenter, told the European Union this week to go to "a thousand thousand hells"; nor in regard to a number of MKs and journalists who have spoken of the events of recent weeks in terms of a divine miracle. What's more surprising is the way the Israel Defense Forces stumbled in its decision to publish a photograph of

an F-35 aircraft on an operational sortie, the first of its kind in the world, over Beirut.

One can understand, albeit barely, the considerations that led the Israel Air Force's commander, Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin, to display the image at a meeting of commanders of foreign air forces that he hosted on Tuesday in Herzliya. Israel wants to show that the advanced warplane is already in use in operational missions. There is certainly a deterrent value to the sight of the plane above Beirut's international airport and over the city's Dahiya neighborhood, home to the city's Shi'ite population, during a heightened period of tension in the north. But it still comes off like inordinate swagger, and perhaps also an attempt to rehabilitate the IAF's image following the downing of an F-16 during the previous escalation of hostilities with Iran and Syria, in February.

>> Israel concerned about F-35 sale to Turkey, expects U.S. to withhold 'upgrade capabilities' ■ Russia considers pulling back Iranian forces from Israel-Syria border

The publication of the dramatic photo of the F-35, which, unsurprisingly, was the source of some patriotic gung-ho headlines in some newspapers, had some embarrassing side effects. The organizers of the Herzliya confab had asked the journalists present not to photograph the lectures. Norkin's remarks about the sophisticated aircraft, with the photograph blurred in the background, were disseminated to the media by the IDF Spokesperson's Unit. But the following evening, the military correspondent of Israel Television News, Nir Dvori, broadcast the photograph itself on the nightly news. The spokesperson's unit scrambled to issue a statement to the effect that the image shown by Dvori did not originate with the IDF and was not broadcast with its authorization. Where, then, does the line run between necessary deterrence and flagrant hubris, with its potentially tragic results? Probably the army itself doesn't even know.

The Americans are apparently less impressed by these large doses of self-confidence. After returning home from recent tours here, a few visitors from the United States, including New York Times

columnist Thomas L. Friedman (twice) and Sen. Lindsay Graham (Rep., South Carolina), have predicted a regional war between Israel and Iran. They were joined this week by Dennis Ross, a former senior official in the Clinton and Obama administrations. "The tinderbox that is the Middle East threatens to explode again," Ross wrote in a New York Daily News op-ed on May 20. He predicted a worsening of the situation soon and warned that, in the absence of a systematic policy, the United States is liable to get sucked into the whirlpool.

According to Ross, the limited Iranian operation against Israel on the day after Trump's announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, reflects Tehran's desire to avoid war at this time. "But no one should be misled," Ross wrote. "Israel and Iran are on a collision course at this point, it seems only a matter of time before such a war starts."

Extreme powers

Buoyed, perhaps, by the war atmosphere in the past month, or as a result of a surfeit of self-confidence amid the chain of achievements, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tripped up in the episode of the amendment to the Basic Law on the Government. The Knesset approved the amendment at the end of April, including a clause stipulating that under extreme circumstances the prime minister and the defense minister can decide by themselves to launch a war or a military operation.

The background to this was apparently the frustration, expressed by Netanyahu and by former Defense Minister Ehud Barak, over the decision-making process in regard to an attack on Iranian nuclear sites, between 2009 and 2013. Barak, who has since become seriously embroiled with Netanyahu, complained afterward that opposition to and reservations by security cabinet ministers, including Yuval Steinitz and Moshe Ya'alon, had been detrimental to developing plans to bomb Iran. In practice, considerable weight was attributed also to the opposition of the heads of all the security arms to the attack plan promoted by Netanyahu and Barak.

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

Is Netanyahu truly eager to arrogate to himself and to the defense minister powers that would also make him almost exclusively responsible should the war deteriorate into a disaster? It's not clear what he was thinking when he pushed the legislation forward initially – but this week he withdrew it. At its meeting on Wednesday night, the security cabinet decided to work to restore the original wording of the legislation, which would transfer the power to decide on a war from the full cabinet to the security cabinet, but without the clause concerning extreme circumstances.

The clause had earlier drawn criticism from Steinitz, Transportation Minister Yisrael Katz (Likud) and Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked (Habayit Hayehudi). Some former senior figures in the defense establishment also exerted pressure on the ministers, and Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot also questioned the implications of the amendment. According to MK Ofer Shelah (Yesh Atid), a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, who fought against adding the new clause, "Netanyahu's ploy was a danger in terms of both security and morality. It's a good thing that a few ministers grasped the scale of the danger and mobilized to put a halt to it."

Amos Harel
Haaretz Correspondent

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 39
The situation in Afghanistan

Security Council
Seventy-third year

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 68/11 and Security Council resolution 2405 (2018), in which the Secretary-General was requested to report every three months on developments in Afghanistan.

2. The report provides an update on the activities of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including political, humanitarian, development and human rights efforts, since the issuance of the previous report, on 27 February 2018 (A/72/768–S/2018/165).

II. Relevant developments

3. The impasse between the Presidential Palace and the former Governor of Balkh Province, Mohammad Atta Noor, concluded with Mr. Noor leaving office on 22 March. In anticipation of the forthcoming elections, several political movements and parties joined forces to lobby for changes to the electoral system. The Independent Election Commission announced that 20 October 2018 was the new date on which the parliamentary and district council elections would be held and launched a nationwide voter registration process. However, electoral preparations were marred by slow decision-making and a series of violent attacks targeting election-related facilities, which lowered the turnout for the voter registration campaign and weakened public trust in the electoral process. The President, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, presented a comprehensive offer of direct negotiations with the Taliban during the second meeting of the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation, receiving broad acclaim from Afghan leaders and strong support from the international community. However, the Taliban announced its 2018 spring offensive without responding directly to the Government's offer of talks. Following the announcement, the Taliban intensified its military operations, launching a series of attacks against

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district administrative centres. The security situation remained highly unstable, with several mass-casualty incidents in urban areas. Complex and suicide attacks became the leading cause of civilian casualties. Overall civilian casualty figures remained high but steady. Afghanistan withdrew its reservation to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and acceded to its Optional Protocol. The United Nations presented its "One United Nations" framework to the President, aimed at strengthening its added value to the people of Afghanistan. The humanitarian situation remained serious, with continuing high levels of displacement, constraints on humanitarian access and drought conditions further exacerbating humanitarian challenges. Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity.

A. Political developments

4. In the previous report, it was noted that the political sphere had been dominated by an extended stand-off between the President and the Jam'iyat-i Islami political party, following the dismissal in December 2017 of Mohammad Atta Noor, a member of that party, from his long-held position as Governor of Balkh Province. Mr. Noor's refusal to leave office led to a stalemate of several months, as the two sides negotiated the terms of his departure. The impasse ended without violence on 22 March, when the former Governor stood down in favour of his chosen successor, fellow Jam'iyat affiliate Ishaq Rahguzar, after the President and Mr. Noor agreed to a deal. Tensions between the President and the Jam'iyat-i Islami political party persisted, however, as the party joined forces with other political movements to lobby for changes to the electoral system.

5. In anticipation of the upcoming elections, opposition politics gained further momentum. On 2 May, Mr. Noor, along with the Second Chief Executive Officer, Mohammad Mohaqeq, travelled to Ankara and met the First Vice-President, Abdul Rashid Dostum, to discuss the consolidation and expansion of the Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan, which was established in June 2017 as an association of political figures mostly from the northern region. The following day, the group announced the formation of a new alliance, the National Coalition of Afghanistan, formally expanding the geographical and ethnic diversity of the previous coalition to include some prominent figures from the Pashtun belt in the south, south-east and east of the country.

6. Faced with an increasingly mobilized political opposition, the Presidential Palace continued to reach out to the First Vice-President, who remains under indictment for the alleged sexual assault of a political rival in 2016 and who has resided in Turkey since May 2017. Supporters of the First Vice-President continued to press for his return ahead of the start of the candidate nominations for the parliamentary elections. On 8 May, a delegation including the founder of Hizb-i Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Faizullah Zaki, travelled to Ankara, reportedly to discuss the preparations for Mr. Dostum's return to Afghanistan.

7. The President and his supporters also made efforts to strengthen their alliance with the Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin) political movement and particularly with its founder, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former insurgent who returned to Kabul in April 2017 after signing a peace agreement with the Government. On 14 March, the Government convened a meeting of representatives of security institutions and line ministries to discuss the implementation of the peace agreement of 2016. Subsequently, the Government and Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin) began the process of vetting a further 160 prisoners for release under the agreement. In May, the Government allocated additional land to the Hizb-i Islami leadership in Kabul,

Nangarhar and Laghman Provinces, and amended the draft land allocation decree to include Hizb-i Islami affiliated returnees to Afghanistan as a priority category for humanitarian land allocation. The Government also took steps to increase the representation of the Gulbuddin faction in leadership positions, most notably through a reshuffle of provincial governors in late February, which rewarded several of Mr. Hekmatyar's associates.

8. Meanwhile, Jam'iyat-i Islami continued to lobby for changes to the electoral system to include an element of proportional representation. Although it had originally emerged in the context of negotiations over Mr. Noor, the demand gained traction and quickly attracted the support of other political movements. In March, a group of 27 political parties, represented by Jam'iyat, Junbesh-i Milli and two factions each of Hizb-i Islami and Hizb-i Wahdat Islami, formed a contact group to lobby both the Government and the international community for changes to the electoral law. On 5 April, at a first meeting with the contact group, the President undertook to seek legal guidance on the issue from the Supreme Court and the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution. At a second meeting on 7 May, the President reiterated his stance that relevant institutions needed to decide on the matter. The group maintained its position throughout the reporting period, despite concerns that the proposed changes could cause further delays in the electoral calendar and that reforms made so close to an election could diminish the credibility of both the reform and the election.

9. A further political complication arose with the Government's announcement on 3 May of the long-debated roll-out of electronic national identity cards (*e-tazkeras*). The announcement triggered an immediate backlash from political figures. The move prompted particularly strong criticism from non-Pashtun leaders, many of whom objected to the inclusion of the word "Afghan" to define citizenship, arguing that the adjective has historically been used to denote Pashtuns. The Chief Executive, Abdullah, who had opposed issuing electronic identity cards until the ethnic controversy was resolved, responded with a speech criticizing the Government on a range of issues including the lack of electoral reform.

10. The Independent Election Commission continued preparations to hold parliamentary and district council elections. On 1 April, the Commission announced that 20 October 2018 would be the new election date, postponed from the previously announced date of 7 July. Voter registration began on 14 April, marking the first full registration of voters since 2003. When completed, the voter registration process is designed to lead to a comprehensive voter registry with polling station-specific voter lists intended to reduce fraud and facilitate operations. In coordination with the Independent Election Commission, the Afghanistan Central Civil Registration Authority began to scale up the issuance of the paper-based national identity cards (*tazkeras*), which are the basis for voter registration. In an effort to promote better coordination between electoral stakeholders, the Government has held regular high-level meetings between the different government institutions involved in the electoral process and the Independent Election Commission, as well as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and key donor countries. On 27 March, the fifth national election forum was held to encourage engagement between the Independent Election Commission and political stakeholders. Provincial election forums were conducted in 31 provinces on 30 April and 1 May. Throughout the process, UNAMA engaged with senior political party leaders to facilitate dialogue with the Independent Election Commission.

11. Nonetheless, many challenges continued to arise in relation to the electoral preparations. Difficulties persisted in recruiting Commission staff, with approximately 140 key positions at both the headquarters and the provincial levels remaining vacant. Operational problems continue to affect the distribution of identity

documents and voter registration stickers. Most notably, the placement of stickers indicating eligibility to vote on identity documents caused security concerns, particularly following reports that insurgents were threatening citizens whose identity documents bore stickers. On 12 May, the Presidential Palace announced that copies of the documents could be used for voter registration purposes, leaving people free to show their original documents without stickers if stopped by insurgents. On 13 May, however, four commissioners told the media that the decision had been illegal under the Election Law, and the acting Chief Electoral Officer resigned over the issue. On 16 May, the Independent Election Commission voted to implement a compromise solution, allowing the issuance of duplicate identity documents for the purposes of voter registration.

12. The apparent divisions within the Independent Election Commission and tensions between the Commission and the Presidential Palace further exacerbated public concerns regarding the credibility of the electoral preparations. Voter registration figures have been substantially lower than Commission targets, affected by security concerns and a lack of institutional capacity in many provinces. As at 17 May, nearly 1.8 million voters had registered, of whom 28 per cent were women. In an attempt to remedy the slow start to the voter registration campaign, the Commission announced on 10 May that it would extend voter registration in urban centres by an additional month, while simultaneously initiating registration in rural areas. However, the slow start to registration, the poor public information campaign and minimal outreach undertaken exacerbated concerns regarding the competence and independence of the Independent Election Commission.

13. The Government took an important step towards advancing a peace process during the second meeting of the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation, held on 28 February, at which the President offered a comprehensive proposal for direct peace talks with the Taliban, without preconditions. In the proposal, he promised to consider issues such as political inclusion, a ceasefire, constitutional review, prisoner releases, the removal of leaders from sanctions lists and the reintegration of refugees and former combatants as part of the peace negotiations. The Government's offer was praised by a wide variety of political figures and received strong support from the international community. In the final declaration of the meeting, participants endorsed the Government's offer and made reference to the possibility of renegotiating contested aspects of the international community's future role in Afghanistan, long a sticking point in the negotiations between the Government and the Taliban. However, the Taliban did not respond formally to the offer, despite reports of internal debates within the group on how to respond. On 25 April, the Taliban announced its annual spring offensive campaign, this year named "Al-Khandaq", without mentioning the Government's peace offer of 28 February.

14. In April, following a suicide attack in a stadium during a wrestling match in Helmand Province, local civil society actors began erecting "peace tents" in the provincial capital. Within days, the movement began to spread across the country, reaching a total of 20 provinces. The protesters called on all combatants to lay down their arms and negotiate a peace deal. The movement was unprecedented as a nationwide, self-generated, civic movement demanding peace and has so far avoided being co-opted by either the Government or the Taliban. Neither the Government nor the Taliban, however, has heeded the calls for a cessation of violence and the opening of dialogue. Following an apparent loss of momentum, on 11 May the Helmand protesters announced that they would march to Kabul and appealed to all sides again to lay down their arms and stop killing civilians during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

B. Security

15. The highly unstable security situation continued to dominate political, humanitarian and development conditions in Afghanistan during the reporting period. UNAMA recorded a total of 5,675 security incidents between 15 February and 15 May, a 7 per cent decrease compared with the same period in 2017. During the reporting period, the eastern region was the most affected, followed by the southern, northern, and south-eastern regions, which accounted for 82 per cent of recorded incidents in total. Armed clashes continued to make up the bulk of conflict-related incidents, accounting for 64 per cent of all incidents, followed by improvised explosive devices, which accounted for 15 per cent of all incidents. However, there was a notable increase in targeted assassinations and suicide attacks, by 35 per cent and 78 per cent, respectively, when compared with the same period in 2017. The number of reported air strikes by international military forces and the Afghan Air Force remained high, representing 5 per cent of all incidents, an increase of 18 per cent since the previous report and of 24 per cent since the same period in 2017.

16. The conflict consolidated along increasingly discernible battle lines with fighting concentrated in a few provinces. Nangarhar, Helmand, Kunar, Kandahar, Faryab and Ghazni Provinces accounted for a total of 60 per cent of security incidents. Despite fierce contestation in some areas, there was no significant change in territorial control between the Government and the Taliban during the reporting period. Mass-casualty suicide attacks in urban centres continued to account for a high number of casualties.

17. On 25 April, the Taliban announced its annual spring offensive, this year named "Al-Khandaq". In the announcement, the group made direct reference to the South Asia strategy of the United States of America, vowing to target international military forces and their supporters within Afghanistan, and invoked as justification a number of specific grievances, including the presence of foreign troops, civilian casualties, the destruction of property and "illegitimate activities". Unlike last year's declaration, this year's announcement focused almost entirely on the Taliban's military strategy, with few references to the group's political and governance objectives. The announcement was accompanied by an immediate spike in conflict-related incidents, with over 50 incidents recorded in 21 provinces on the same day as the announcement, suggesting a significant degree of command and control and an ability to match stated strategy with operations.

18. In subsequent weeks, the Taliban increased the frequency of its attacks against district administrative centres, temporarily overrunning Raghistan and Kohistan in Badakhshan Province, Qal'ah-ye Zal in Kunduz Province, Talah wa Barfak in Baghlan Province, Bal Chiragh in Faryab Province and Anjiristan, Deh Yak and Jaghatuy in Ghazni Province. For the first time since 2016, on 14 May the Taliban also launched a large-scale assault on a provincial capital, Farah City in the west of Afghanistan, besieging key government buildings inside the city. The attack prompted heavy armed clashes, which lasted for several days before the Taliban was eventually repelled by Afghan National Defence and Security Forces with international air support.

19. The Government continued to reform the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces in accordance with its four-year road map on security sector reform. During the reporting period, the Government completed the transfer of the Afghan Border Police from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defence and renamed it the Afghan Border Forces, in line with its new focus on combat operations. The Government also continued to scale up the Afghan Special Forces as part of a plan to double their number under the four-year road map. During the reporting period,

2,000 additional commandos joined the special operations battalions. Efforts also continued to increase the size of the Afghan Air Force, which is expected to double by 2023 under the road map. In addition, the Government brought forward the retirement of senior military officials under the provisions of the Inherent Law of 2017, with a retirement order for a second group of 61 Afghan National Army generals issued by the President on 12 May.

20. During the reporting period the Government began preparations for the establishment of a new security force, the Afghan National Army Territorial Force. The Force is expected to comprise about 36,000 personnel and will mainly be responsible for defending areas cleared of insurgents by military operations. Around 5,000 soldiers have been recruited in a pilot phase to be rolled out in four provinces and have commenced training under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence.

21. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP) maintained its presence in Nangarhar, Kunar and Jowzjan Provinces. Armed clashes between the Taliban and ISIL-KP were reported in Nangarhar and Kunar Provinces, as the two groups continued a months-long struggle for control over territory. The group also claimed responsibility for 11 mass-casualty suicide attacks in the reporting period, including attacks in Kabul on 30 April and 9 May. In the attack carried out on 30 April, a suicide attacker targeted a checkpoint of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces, followed by a second attack approximately 30 minutes later. The second suicide attacker was reportedly posing as a journalist and detonated his vest among a group of journalists who were reporting on the first incident. In a worrying development, these attacks, mostly against Shia targets, appeared designed to foment sectarian strife.

22. Three incidents involving United Nations personnel were reported, including one case of intimidation and two criminal incidents.

C. Regional cooperation

23. Since the previous report, there have been significant steps towards consolidating a common international approach on peace and stability in Afghanistan. On 28 February, the Government hosted the second meeting of the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation, with the participation of 26 countries, as well as the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations. In his statement at the event, Mr. Ghani announced that the Government is open to peace talks with the Taliban. In a joint declaration at the conclusion of the event, participants unanimously welcomed the President's offer and agreed to greater regional and international cooperation on peace and reconciliation and counter-terrorism.

24. This consensus on peace in Afghanistan was further strengthened at a conference held in Tashkent on 27 March, which was attended by high-level representatives of 23 countries, as well as the European Union and the United Nations. The participants reiterated their support for the offer by the Government of Afghanistan to hold direct talks with the Taliban. In the final conference declaration, participants expressed support for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process, leading to an inclusive peace agreement between the Government and the Taliban. The opposition of the international community to all manifestations of terrorism without distinction was also stressed. In a further effort to sustain the international momentum towards a peace process, Indonesia hosted a trilateral meeting of religious scholars from Afghanistan, Indonesia and Pakistan on 11 May. The scholars issued a statement calling on all fighting factions to lay down their arms, endorsing a peace process and condemning terrorist tactics such as suicide bombings as un-Islamic. The Taliban was invited to send clerics to the conference but declined and, following the

conference, issued a statement dismissing the conference as an initiative of the United States of America and noting that it had failed to pass a fatwa against jihad in Afghanistan.

25. Afghanistan has taken steps towards developing closer regional economic cooperation. On 23 February, the Afghan segment of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline was officially inaugurated at a ceremony in Herat City, attended by the President of Afghanistan, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, the President of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, and the Minister of State for External Affairs of India, M.J. Akbar. Speaking at the ceremony, Mr. Ghani remarked that the pipeline represented an important milestone for regional economic connectivity. On 19 April, the senior officials meeting of the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process was held in Istanbul. At the meeting, the participating countries, led by Afghanistan and Turkey as the Co-chairs for 2018, agreed to a seventh confidence-building measure on agriculture under the Heart of Asia framework and discussed ways of reinvigorating regional cooperation through practical measures related to the confidence-building measures.

26. Following months of heightened tensions, Afghanistan and Pakistan finalized an agreement on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity. On 6 April, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, visited Kabul for the third round of talks on the Action Plan. During the visit, Mr. Abbasi held separate meetings with Mr. Ghani and the Chief Executive, Abdullah, to discuss the Afghan peace process, the regional political and security situation, bilateral trade, the return of refugees, border violations and the fight against terrorism. At the conclusion of the visit, the two sides agreed to seven key principles within the framework of the Action Plan. However, the finalization of the framework was temporarily delayed following cross-border fighting on 15 and 16 April. Soon after the incidents, military officials of Afghanistan and Pakistan met to defuse tensions and agree to a ceasefire. On 1 May, at a ceremony attended by Mr. Abbasi, Pakistan formally reopened the Ghulam Khan border crossing point between Khost Province in Afghanistan and North Waziristan in Pakistan, which had remained closed since 2014. The opening of the crossing, the third largest official crossing between Afghanistan and Pakistan, is expected to increase cross-border trade. On 14 May, the Action Plan was finalized in Islamabad by the two countries' delegations, led by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Hekmat Khalil Karzai, and the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Tehmina Janjua, respectively. Under the Action Plan, six working groups for cooperation were operationalized in different fields.

III. Human rights

27. On 12 April, UNAMA released a report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict for the first quarter of 2018.[1] The Mission documented 2,258 civilian casualties (763 people killed and 1,495 injured) between 1 January and 31 March 2018, reflecting levels of harm similar to the same periods in 2016 and 2017. UNAMA attributed 67 per cent of all civilian casualties to anti-government elements (50 per cent to the Taliban, 11 per cent to ISIL-KP, 4 per cent to unidentified anti-government elements, including self-proclaimed ISIL-KP, and 2 per cent to fighting between anti-government elements), 18 per cent to pro-government forces, 11 per cent to unattributed crossfire, and 4 per cent to other incidents, including explosive remnants of war and cross-border shelling. For the first time, suicide and complex attacks became the leading cause of civilian casualties, surpassing ground engagements. The

[1] United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, "Quarterly report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict: 1 January to 31 March 2018".

Mission also noted that civilian casualties from attacks by anti-government elements deliberately targeting civilians more than doubled compared with the first quarter of 2017, accounting for 39 per cent of all civilian casualties and 59 per cent of the civilian casualties attributed to anti-government elements. Consistent with the trends observed in 2017, anti-government elements continued to direct attacks against the minority Shia Muslim population, causing 154 civilian casualties (49 people killed and 105 injured), nearly all from suicide and complex attacks for which responsibility was claimed by ISIL-KP.

28. The use of improvised explosive device tactics (including complex, suicide and non-suicide attacks) caused 1,018 civilian casualties (311 persons killed and 707 injured), comprising 45 per cent of all civilian casualties. Ground engagements accounted for 663 civilian casualties (161 persons killed and 502 injured), amounting to 30 per cent of all civilian casualties. UNAMA continued to document high numbers of civilian casualties from aerial strikes: 142 civilian casualties (67 persons killed and 75 injured), with women and children comprising more than half of those casualties. The Mission documented 583 child casualties (155 children killed and 428 injured), accounting for 25 per cent of all civilian casualties. Casualties among women decreased by 24 per cent, resulting in a total of 60 women killed and 157 injured, with more than half of those casualties caused by ground engagements.

29. On 7 May, the Mission released a special report entitled "Airstrikes in Dasht-e-Archi district, Kunduz Province, 2 April 2018" on airstrikes carried out by the Afghan Air Force during an outdoor religious ceremony in a Taliban-controlled area in Kunduz Province. The report notes with concern the indiscriminate nature of the attack, which resulted in at least 107 casualties (36 persons killed and 71 injured), most of whom were children, and calls on the Government to conduct an impartial investigation. On 16 May, the President issued a public statement apologizing for the incident, expressing condolences and offering compensation. On 10 May, the Mission released a special report entitled "Election-related attacks and abuses during the initial voter registration period". In the report, it is noted that, since the commencement of voter registration on 14 April, there had been 23 verified election-related security incidents, resulting in 271 civilian casualties (86 persons killed and 185 injured), the majority of whom were women and children, including an attack on 22 April in a mostly Shia-inhabited area of Kabul that had caused the deaths of 60 civilians and injured 13 others, responsibility for which was claimed by ISIL-KP. The report further documented the abduction of 26 civilians and incidents involving threats, intimidation and harassment. It was also noted that around 75 per cent of election-related security incidents occurred in schools or mosques used for election-related purposes, disrupting education activities.

30. From 1 January to 31 March, the country task force on monitoring and reporting verified 11 incidents of attacks against schools and related personnel (five by the Taliban, three by ISIL-KP, two by undetermined anti-government elements and one by a pro-government militia), compared with 13 incidents in the previous quarter. Of concern were two incidents of threats by the Taliban against education facilities that led to widespread school closures in the provinces of Kunduz (342 schools) and Logar (29 schools). In addition, the task force verified the military use of three schools (one by ISIL-KP and two by the Afghan National Army), compared with seven schools in the previous quarter. The task force verified 17 incidents of attacks against hospitals and related personnel, including eight attacks against health-care workers, five threats of attacks and four attacks on health-care facilities (five by the Taliban, seven by ISIL-KP, one each by an undetermined armed group and the National Directorate for Security, one jointly by the Afghan National Police and the National Directorate for Security, one jointly by the Afghan Special Forces and international military forces

and one by a pro-government militia), compared with seven incidents in the previous quarter.

31. The Mission verified the recruitment and use of 19 boys by anti-government elements, compared with five during the previous reporting period. As at 31 March, the Ministry of Justice reported 140 children detained in juvenile rehabilitation centres on national security-related charges, including for their association with armed groups, compared with 171 in December 2017. The task force verified one incident of sexual violence against a boy. The task force also verified 13 incidents of denial of humanitarian access (six each by ISIL-KP and the Taliban and one by the Afghan National Police), compared with six in the last quarter.

32. The Government continued its efforts to address violence against women. On 3 March, the President signed a decree amending the Elimination of Violence against Women Law of 2009, aimed at aligning some of its sentencing provisions with the revised Penal Code, and a decree amending the Penal Code, ensuring the applicability of the Elimination of Violence against Women Law, with regard to crimes of violence against women. On 4 March a presidential decree exempted crimes of violence against women from eligibility for non-custodial sentencing options. On 28 March, the Government released its fifth report (March 2016 to March 2017) on the implementation of the Elimination of Violence against Women Law of 2009, recording 4,290 cases of violence against women. International Women's Day was marked in Afghanistan with over 30 events nationwide. In coordination with its partners, UNAMA organized 14 events, highlighting women's rights and the importance of women's role in peace and security and decision-making processes.

33. On 17 April, Afghanistan acceded to the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, fulfilling one of the Government's key voluntary pledges pursuant to its candidature for membership of the Human Rights Council. On the same date, Afghanistan also withdrew its reservation to the Convention, fulfilling another long-standing pledge.

34. UNAMA continued to promote the role of civil society through a series of seminars and workshops in 15 provinces. On 30 April, UNAMA launched a compilation of 34 provincial road maps for peace, a product of the Afghan People's Dialogue on Peace, facilitated by UNAMA with civil society, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the Afghan High Peace Council. The Dialogue offered opportunities for developing consensus on the primacy of a political solution to ending the conflict and led to the echoing of calls for peace, development and justice. Civil society activists and media personnel continued to face threats and attacks. UNAMA documented three incidents that killed 11 and injured 6 journalists and media personnel, including a targeted attack in Kabul on 30 April in which 9 journalists were killed and 6 were injured.

IV. Implementation of the Kabul Process and coordination of development assistance

35. In line with its commitments at the conferences held in London and Brussels, on 2 April, the Government finalized an action plan for implementing its policy of 10 January to increase the number of women working in the civil service. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission has also taken measures to standardize the structures of government ministries and agencies based on functional and needs assessments conducted at the national and subnational levels. Following this process, the Commission identified 17,700 vacant positions, including 8,700 for teachers, and held competitive exams through a countrywide mass-recruitment process for 225,670 eligible candidates. The first results of these exams

were announced in May. In a further effort to strengthen the civil service, a new administrative procedure decree and amendments to the Civil Servants Law were approved in March. The Government also made progress on improving access to information. On 3 March, the President endorsed a new Access to Information Law through a decree. Among other amendments to the Access to Information Law of 2014, under the new law an independent commission for access to information was established and protections for whistle-blowers were introduced.

36. In February, the President, together with the Afghanistan Land Authority, launched the national independent development programme for land administration to establish a comprehensive land register database, which will provide a basis for addressing land usurpation. The Government also continued work on its new land allocation decree, which will govern the allocation of land to returnees and internally displaced persons. Following extensive consultation with stakeholders, including UNAMA, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), a draft of the decree was discussed by the Council of Ministers on 4 March and is pending finalization.

37. On 15 May, UNAMA released its second annual report on anti-corruption efforts. The report commended the Government for implementing several key anti-corruption reforms in 2017 and early 2018, including the launch of its anti-corruption strategy in October 2017, strengthened anti-corruption measures in the new Penal Code, the increasing capacity of the Anti-Corruption Justice Centre and the adoption of a more transparent national budget. However, the report also highlighted significant gaps in the institutional anti-corruption framework and provided recommendations for further reforms to bring Afghanistan more fully into compliance with the United Nations Convention against Corruption. The Government made some progress in drafting an anti-corruption law. On 1 April, following a long delay in the drafting process, the President instructed the Ministry of Justice to finalize the law. On 14 May, the draft law was discussed by the High Council for Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption in the presence of civil society and the international community.

38. The Government took steps towards implementing its new Penal Code, which came into force on 14 February. According to the Ministry of Justice, 5,000 copies of the Code were printed, of which 1,219 copies have been distributed to courts and prosecution offices countrywide. The remaining copies were distributed to other government offices and international stakeholders. In response to the high demand for copies, several international donors initiated the procurement of an additional 10,000 copies to be made available to the Ministry of Justice for distribution. In April, international donor agencies finished planning a 26-week training programme, to be rolled out jointly by the training departments of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General's Office and the Ministry of Justice. In April, UNAMA started a survey on the implementation of the new Penal Code at the subnational level. The results of the survey and accompanying observations will be shared with relevant institutions and the international community to further guide capacity-building efforts.

39. Since the previous report, the Anti-Corruption Justice Centre has tried an additional seven cases, bringing the overall caseload to 34 cases involving 142 accused persons since the Centre was established in 2016. The number of cases tried in absentia, owing to a lack of capacity among the security institutions to enforce court summons, has remained high.

40. In response to the expectation expressed by the President that the United Nations should "deliver as one", under the Government's leadership, the United Nations in Afghanistan has undertaken a comprehensive review of its work. On 16 April, the

President met representatives of the United Nations entities to discuss the progress made under the "One United Nations" framework for Afghanistan. At the meeting, the President was briefed on the progress made in the six thematic areas under the framework: education; food security, nutrition and livelihoods; health; return and reintegration: rule of law; and normative work. A paper describing the approach was presented. The President emphasized that poverty reduction was a key objective for the Government.

41. During April and May, UNAMA supported the Government and donors with the preparations for the ministerial conference on Afghanistan, to be hosted by the United Nations jointly with Afghanistan in Geneva on 28 November. UNAMA, donors and the Government identified key issues for the conference agenda and steps to be taken by the Government prior to the conference. In order to formulate an update to the deliverables under the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework, which expire at the end of 2018, UNAMA hosted a joint workshop with donors and government representatives to assess the existing deliverables.

V. Humanitarian assistance and returnees

42. To date in 2018, 75,643 people have been newly displaced by conflict, with 40,301 displaced between 15 February and 15 May, a decrease of 65 per cent compared with the same period in 2017. Particularly high levels of displacement were recorded in Kunduz Province, with more than 13,000 displaced people, and Faryab Province, with more than 10,000 displaced. Many displaced families have been forced to move multiple times and have no immediate prospect of returning to their areas of origin in safety and dignity. Humanitarian partners provided 121,684 people displaced by conflict with life-saving assistance during the reporting period.

43. Trauma care remains a priority in terms of humanitarian needs, particularly given the recent increase in the number of suicide attacks in densely populated areas. The provinces with the highest requirements for trauma care are Kandahar, Kunduz, Nangarhar and Takhar. During the reporting period, the 15 partners of the health cluster provided consultations to 496,834 people, of whom 56 per cent were women and girls.

44. In mid-April, the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock officially declared a drought. The main planting season, spanning from October 2017 to February 2018, was severely compromised by the La Niña weather effect, which saw a precipitation deficit of 70 per cent in most of the country. The low level of precipitation was the main factor behind a forecast reduction in wheat production from 4.2 million metric tons in 2017 to 3.5 million metric tons in 2018. Humanitarian partners estimate that more than 2 million people will be affected by the drought across two thirds of the country, with 1.4 million severely affected people in need of emergency food, water, hygiene, sanitation and nutrition support to survive. Drought-related migration has begun in some provinces, while depleted food stocks were reported in Badghis and Ghor Provinces. More than half a million people may have to leave their homes, if they are not provided with food and water in their villages in time. Based on existing humanitarian stockpiles and available resources, the humanitarian community is only able to support 90,000 people for a period of two months with half-food rations. Overall, partners have estimated that $136 million is required to provide a comprehensive response to 1.4 million people for a period of six months, which includes possible migration movements. Almost two thirds of that amount is required to support food needs alone.

45. A total of 220,123 Afghan citizens — including spontaneous returnees, deportees and refugees — returned to their home country during the reporting period.

From mid-February to 15 May, 11,413 people arrived from Pakistan (11,035 spontaneous arrivals and 378 deportees) and 202,644 from the Islamic Republic of Iran (84,478 spontaneous arrivals and 118,166 deportees), according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). UNHCR resumed its voluntary repatriation programme from Pakistan on 1 March after the winter pause and assisted in the return of 5,722 people. In addition, UNHCR repatriated 311 refugees from the Islamic Republic of Iran and 33 from other countries during the reporting period.

46. The total number of returnees from Pakistan was 75 per cent lower than in the previous year, and similar to 2014 levels, when the lowest return figure was recorded. The lower number of returns this year is linked to the improved protection conditions in Pakistan, along with the decision by the Federal Cabinet of Pakistan to extend the validity of the proof-of-registration cards, which provide temporary legal stay to 1.4 million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan, until June 2018. The authorities of Pakistan have begun the issuance of Afghan Citizen Cards to over 878,000 undocumented Afghans who have applied to register since August 2017. The cards will remain valid until 30 June 2018, and holders are required to return to Afghanistan to register for civil documentation, including a passport and a visa for Pakistan, before returning to Pakistan. An estimated 400,000 Afghans remain undocumented in Pakistan, and are vulnerable to the threat of deportation should the protection environment deteriorate.

47. Constraints on humanitarian access continued, with a total of 70 incidents affecting the United Nations and its humanitarian partners from 15 February to 15 May. Since January, 13 aid workers have been killed, 9 injured and 21 abducted. Compared with 2017, there have been more direct armed attacks on health-care facilities. Access to communities in need of assistance in contested areas and areas under the control of anti-government elements remained a persistent challenge for humanitarian partners.

48. Seven cases of polio have been confirmed this year, with poliovirus transmission currently limited to five districts in Kandahar, Kunar and Nangarhar. One subnational and two nationwide polio vaccination campaigns were conducted during the reporting period, aiming to reach more than 6 million and 9.9 million children, respectively. Inaccessibility owing to vaccination bans and active conflict remains a major concern, with the number of inaccessible children increasing from 60,000 in February to 110,000 in March, 130,000 in April and more than half a million in May. Permanent transit vaccination teams placed around inaccessible areas and major transit routes vaccinate over 1.1 million children every month.

49. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) scaled up clearance activities in support of the national plan and has renewed its focus on risk education. In support of IOM and UNHCR, UNMAS continued to provide risk education to returnees through border points, reaching 84,769 men, women and children in the first quarter of 2018. In the first quarter of 2018, victim-operated improvised explosive devices, referred to as "pressure-plate improvised explosive devices" in previous reports, were a leading cause of conflict-related death and injury of civilians in Afghanistan. There were 274 civilian casualties due to landmines (including victim-operated improvised explosive devices, in use in Afghanistan since 2010, and earlier emplaced anti-personnel and anti-tank mines) and explosive remnants of war during the first quarter of 2018, a 54 per cent decrease compared with the same period in 2017. In the first quarter of 2018, 89 per cent of victims of explosive remnants of war were children, an 8 per cent increase from 2017.

50. To support the Government in addressing the increasing humanitarian access constraints caused by the presence of victim-operated improvised explosive devices, UNMAS co-led a task force, with the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination, to

define procedures and training requirements for the Government to be able to safely clear improvised explosive devices abandoned by parties to the conflict, and enable greater access for civilians and humanitarian actors.

51. As of 1 May, humanitarian activities in Afghanistan had received $129.3 million in funding, of which $98.2 million was for activities included in the Humanitarian Response Plan. The number of people targeted for assistance is 2.8 million people.

VI. Counter-narcotics

52. In May, the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics released a socioeconomic report on opium cultivation in Afghanistan in 2017, with technical support from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The report provides a comprehensive analysis of the causes and consequences of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The report recommends measures for building resilience to opium poppy cultivation in rural communities, including a mix of alternative development and law enforcement interventions to reduce opium poppy cultivation.

53. The Government, supported by international partners, continued its counter-narcotics operations during the reporting period. From 1 March to 30 April, Afghan law enforcement authorities conducted a total of 612 counter-narcotics operations, leading to seizures of 541 kilograms of heroin, 1,157 kilograms of opium, 32 kilograms of methamphetamine, 5,639 kilograms of hashish, 2,390 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) K-tablets, 184 kilograms of solid precursor chemicals and 883 litres of liquid precursor chemicals. Eight heroin manufacturing laboratories were also dismantled. In total, 685 suspects were arrested and 86 vehicles, 28 weapons and 212 mobile phones were seized. One officer of the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan was killed while carrying out counter-narcotics operations during the reporting period.

VII. Mission support

54. As at 30 April, the Mission's vacancy rates were 17 per cent for international staff and 6 per cent for national staff, compared with the approved rates of 14 per cent and 7.5 per cent, respectively. The proportion of female staff, despite special measures granted for the Mission to recruit and retain more national female staff, remained very low. As at 30 April, the percentage of women in each category of staff stood at: 32 per cent for international staff, 38 per cent for United Nations Volunteers, 11 per cent for National Professional Officers and 7 per cent for Local level staff. Between 1 February and 30 April 2018, UNAMA conducted 224 road and 13 air missions, as well as 736 reverse outreach missions during which district representatives visited UNAMA field offices.

VIII. Observations

55. As noted in the previous report, a series of brutal attacks in early 2018 made the task of bringing about a negotiated settlement to the conflict both more difficult and more urgent. The National Unity Government's offer to the Taliban, made at the second meeting of the Kabul Process, to hold talks without preconditions presented a constructive way forward. The resounding international support for the offer expressed at the conferences held in Kabul and Tashkent provides further impetus to the peace negotiations. Ultimately, however, peace in Afghanistan must be made by and between Afghans. In that respect, I am heartened by the emergence of a genuine

civic peace movement, in which citizens across Afghanistan have joined forces to advocate an end to war. I urge all parties to heed the call of the Afghan people, whose enduring desire for peace can be fulfilled only through inclusive negotiations.

56. Ensuring an inclusive and credible electoral process while a significant percentage of the population lives in parts of the country that are insecure and where the reach of State authority is limited remains a fundamental challenge. The peaceful conduct of elections at all stages is critical in enabling people to exercise their right to vote without fear or threat of insecurity. Of concern are the ongoing attempts to disrupt the electoral process through violent means, including tactics such as attacks on election-related facilities, abductions of electoral staff and intimidation and harassment of registered voters. I condemn the suicide attacks targeting a national registration centre in Kabul on 22 April and a voter registration site in Khost Province on 6 May, each of which caused dozens of civilian casualties. Apart from the direct harm that they inflict on the population, such attacks represent an assault on the fundamental right of citizens to vote. The commitment and courage demonstrated by the people of Afghanistan, who continue to register as voters in the face of such threats, is heartening. I call on all parties to respect the constitutional rights of the Afghan people and to enable the conduct of elections that are worthy of their courage.

57. Operational challenges continue to be faced in the preparations for the elections. Slow decision-making and protracted debates over electoral issues risk delaying the timetable for parliamentary and district council elections, while undermining public confidence in the electoral process. I encourage the electoral management bodies to streamline their decision-making processes, take necessary decisions swiftly and strengthen coordination with other institutions and with civil society in all aspects of electoral preparations. Apart from allowing Afghans to elect parliamentary and district council representatives of their choice, credible and inclusive elections can serve as an important step in Afghanistan's ongoing democratic consolidation. To ensure the sustainability of Afghanistan's electoral institutions, it is vital that the independence of the electoral management bodies is respected.

58. The fragmented political environment in Afghanistan poses another challenge for the country, not only for the forthcoming elections, but also more generally for governance and reconciliation. Political will and unity are very much needed in order to hold credible elections and advance the peace process. Progress in that regard will also help to pave the way for much-needed reforms to take hold. I call upon all Afghan political actors to ensure a commonality of purpose and a joining of efforts for the success of those essential processes.

59. The conflict continues to inflict an unacceptable toll on the citizens of Afghanistan. I am deeply concerned by the continued rise in civilian casualties from the indiscriminate use of suicide improvised explosive devices by anti-government elements. This tactic has now become the leading cause of civilian casualties, surpassing combined casualties by all parties from ground engagements in the first quarter of 2018. I note with concern that the number of civilian casualties from attacks by anti-government elements deliberately targeting civilians more than doubled compared with the first quarter of 2017 and call upon anti-government elements to put an immediate stop to the indiscriminate use of suicide improvised explosive devices. Consistent with the disturbing trends observed in 2016 and 2017, anti-government elements continued to carry out direct attacks against the minority Shia Muslim population, causing 154 civilian casualties, nearly all from suicide and complex attacks claimed by ISIL-KP. Recalling the obligations of all parties to avoid civilian casualties under international human rights and humanitarian law, I call on anti-government elements to cease these atrocious attacks against civilian targets.

60. Protecting women from violence and holding perpetrators to account are essential to ensuring women's meaningful participation in socioeconomic, political, peace and security processes. The Government and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission regularly monitor the implementation of domestic laws on crimes of violence against women. I encourage the full implementation of the national strategy and action plan on the elimination of violence against women, as well as the finalization of the Government's third periodic report to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, all of which would provide an important demonstration of its commitment to protecting the rights and lives of all women.

61. With the accession to the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Government is fulfilling one of the voluntary pledges made in support of its candidacy for membership of the Human Rights Council. The United Nations stands ready to provide the necessary technical support in establishing a national preventive mechanism for the prevention of torture, in line with the Government's commitments under the Convention. Following the withdrawal of its reservation to the Convention, Afghanistan now recognizes the competence of the Committee against Torture to conduct confidential enquiries into allegations of the systematic use of torture on its territory. The United Nations will continue to assist Afghanistan in its efforts to eliminate the use of torture in government-run detention facilities.

62. The rise in the recruitment and use of children by parties to the conflict, which increased three-fold compared with the previous reporting period, is deeply concerning. As the recruitment and use of children during armed conflict is one of the six grave violations identified by the Security Council, I call upon all parties to the conflict to put an immediate stop to the recruitment and use of children and urge the Government to adopt the measures necessary to establish referral and rehabilitation mechanisms for victims.

63. The Government of Afghanistan continued to pursue important reforms. The promulgation of the Access to Information Law, which contains additional protections for whistle-blowers, represents a welcome step towards promoting accountable governance. As the Government implements its anti-corruption strategy, continuous constructive engagement with local institutions, civil society and international partners will remain crucial, as combating corruption in Afghanistan will require the sustained and concerted efforts of all stakeholders. In line with the recommendations of the UNAMA anti-corruption report, I encourage the Government to take further steps towards institutionalizing the necessary anti-corruption reforms, in accordance with the guidance on implementing the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

64. I am deeply concerned by the ongoing drought in Afghanistan, which has exacerbated the humanitarian situation. The low levels of precipitation experienced throughout the planting season are now threatening the survival of more than 2 million people who depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. Migration due to the drought has already been reported, and more than half a million people may be displaced if they are not provided with timely and adequate food and water supplies in their home villages. As humanitarian partners scale up their assistance to more than 1.4 million of the most vulnerable people, I call upon donors to respond to the urgent appeal by the United Nations for an additional $137 million to meet the basic needs of the drought-affected population.

65. The United Nations is committed to maintaining its strong and enduring relationship with the people and the Government of Afghanistan. The One United Nations framework developed by the United Nations system in Afghanistan, brings

its work into closer alignment with the priorities of the Government, while reflecting the global objectives of the United Nations. I welcome the strong commitment of the United Nations agencies, funds, and programmes to continue their close collaboration with local institutions to enhance the quality of service delivery to all Afghans.

66. I thank all United Nations personnel in Afghanistan and my Special Representative for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Tadamichi Yamamoto, for their continued dedication under such challenging conditions to fulfil our commitments in support of the people of Afghanistan.

United Nations A/72/889–S/2018/546

General Assembly
Security Council

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8 June 2018

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda items 35 and 40

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 7 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to draw your attention to the continued circulation by the Republic of Armenia of various papers on behalf of the puppet regime it has set up in the occupied territories of my country in violation of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. We resolutely reject such an apparent abuse by Armenia of its privilege of being a Member of the United Nations for misleading the international community by means of rude falsifications.

It is abundantly clear that, by propagating the unlawful regime, which is ultimately nothing other than the product of aggression, ethnic cleansing and racial discrimination, Armenia denies the facts, tries to evade responsibility and patently demonstrates its total disregard for the generally accepted norms and principles of international law and the position of the international community. Armenia's provocative actions also demonstrate how it is far from engaging in a constructive search for a political settlement of the conflict.

In its resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993), the Security Council condemned the use of force against Azerbaijan and the bombardment and occupation of its territories and reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory. In response to Armenia's territorial claims and forcible actions, the Council reconfirmed that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is an integral part of the Republic of Azerbaijan and demanded the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces from all the occupied territories.

Armenia's persistent denial of its responsibility for the aggression against Azerbaijan and unlawful occupation of and military presence in my country's territory has been effectively put to an end by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of

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Human Rights in its landmark judgment (Merits) of 16 June 2015 in the case of *Chiragov and others v. Armenia*. Having examined the evidence presented, the Court concluded that:

- "The Republic of Armenia, through its military presence and the provision of military equipment and expertise, has been significantly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from an early date";
- "This military support has been — and continues to be — decisive for the conquest of and continued control over the territories in issue";
- The regime in those territories "survives by virtue of the military, political, financial and other support given to it by Armenia which, consequently, exercises effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories".[1]

All papers Armenia circulates in the United Nations and other international organizations on behalf of the unlawful puppet regime are null and void ab initio and must be rejected and disregarded at the outset.

Armenia's confusing attempts to introduce Azerbaijan's internationally recognized territory — the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other occupied districts — by different names are equally invalid as they clearly violate international law, the Constitution and legislation of Azerbaijan and the principles and procedures for international standardization of geographical names established within the United Nations. Such attempts of Armenia are evidently aimed at distorting and falsifying the history and removing any signs of the Azerbaijani cultural and historical roots of the occupied territories.

We have repeatedly stated, and I want to stress again, that Armenia's annexationist and colonization policy has no chance of succeeding. The Nagorno-Karabakh region has always been and will remain an inalienable and inseparable part of Azerbaijan. Armenia will be compelled to withdraw from all the occupied territories of my country.

Yerevan must drop its futile attempts to mislead its own people and the wider international community, engage constructively in the conflict settlement process and comply with its international obligations. The sooner Armenia realizes the lack of any prospect of its dangerous and futureless political agenda and admits responsibility for the war it waged against Azerbaijan and its consequences, the sooner the conflict will be resolved and our countries and peoples will be able to benefit from long-awaited peace, stability and cooperation.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35 and 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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[1] Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, *Chiragov and others v. Armenia*, Application No. 13216/05, Judgment (Merits), 16 June 2015, paras. 180, 183 and 185–186.

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General Assembly

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Seventy-second session
Agenda items 14, 19 (a), 21 (a) and 22 (b)

Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields

Sustainable development: implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development and of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development

Globalization and interdependence: role of the United Nations in promoting development in the context of globalization and interdependence

Groups of countries in special situations: follow-up to the second United Nations Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries

Letter dated 7 June 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to inform you of an event of historic significance — the inauguration of the first section of the southern gas corridor, which will feed Turkey and Europe with Caspian gas resources from the Shah Deniz-2 field.

The foundation of the southern gas corridor was laid on 20 September 2014. As one of the biggest projects in the world with an investment volume of around $40 billion, the 3,500-km-long southern gas corridor includes the development of the Shah Deniz-2 oil field, the South Caucasus pipeline through Georgia, the trans-Anatolian pipeline through Turkey and the trans-Adriatic pipeline. The southern gas corridor will contribute to addressing energy security issues. Issues related to energy security are very high on the global agenda today, and national security issues depend to a large extent on energy security.

It goes without saying that the support of all our partners has been vital for the realization of this project. Today, we are at the dawn of a new era where we witness world-scale oil and gas projects in the region carried out within the framework of

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broad international cooperation. This project will serve to further deepen cooperation in Europe and in our region not only in energy but also in all other sectors. Seven countries — Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Italy and Turkey — are involved in the implementation of the southern gas corridor.

The southern gas corridor is characterized as one of the major projects of our century and as synonymous with the enhancement of cooperation for the future prosperity and economic and social well-being of the countries and peoples of the region. The pipeline will contribute to the diversification of global energy supply, make its contribution towards meeting the world's rising energy demands and complement global efforts aimed at achieving the relevant Sustainable Development Goals. The goals and objectives of the southern gas corridor are not confined to the expansion of energy introduction capacity and new energy transport infrastructure, but also relate to collaboration among countries and peoples aimed at promoting peace, stability, development and mutual prosperity.

We should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 14, 19 (a), 21 (a) and 22 (b).

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Azerbaijan
to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Kaha **Imnadze**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Turkey
to the United Nations

United Nations A/72/891–S/2018/554

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 72 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 7 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the comment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine regarding the Moscow City Court decision on the case of Roman Sushchenko, who is being unlawfully detained in the Russian Federation (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 72 (c), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 7 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Comment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine regarding Moscow City Court decision on the case of Roman Sushchenko, who is being unlawfully detained in Russia

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its strong protest against the unlawful decision of the Moscow City Court to sentence Ukrainian journalist Roman Sushchenko to 12 years in a maximum security prison on the fabricated charges of "spying".

The court's disregard of the facts of provocations against Roman Sushchenko as well as gross falsifications of the case, which were proven by defence, is yet another demonstration of the lack of justice in the Russian Federation.

Cynical dismissal by Russia of the fundamental human rights reflects the necessity to strengthen international pressure upon Moscow in order to stop its aggression, repressions and infringements of Ukrainian citizens.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine demands that the Russian side immediately abolishes this groundless judgment, releases Roman Sushchenko and provides for his unobstructed return back to Ukraine.

We call on the world community, international human rights organizations to take all possible measures to expedite the release and return to Ukraine of Roman Sushchenko and other Ukrainian citizens, who have become hostages of the Kremlin regime in Russia's ongoing aggression against our country.

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Security Council

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Seventy-second session
Agenda item 44
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 8 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith two documents detailing the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships (see annex II) during the month of March 2018.

I also wish to inform you that the occupation regime illegally issued three notices to airmen relating to exercises conducted by the Turkish Air Force in March 2018.

It should be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal airport of Tympou. In addition, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) via radio calls. Meanwhile, Nicosia FIR infringements and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. Turkey's policy of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, has a negative impact on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus.

The above-mentioned actions of Turkey, which has illegally occupied the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus since 1974, are clearly aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. In that respect, I would like to underline, once again, that there is only one legal authority in Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus, as stipulated in various Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), in which the Council declared the establishment of the so-called "TRNC" as null and void.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation. The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for adherence to

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the principle of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Finally, I would like to urge Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to heed the calls of the international community and contribute to a meaningful resumption of the peace process, instead of focusing on undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kornelios **Korneliou**

Annex I to the letter dated 8 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 March	1007–1120	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC)
2 March	1052–1205	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1845–1920	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
3 March	1000–1627	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
4 March	1502–1604	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
5 March	0840–1035	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0853–0913	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1034–1047	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1206–1657	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1232–1247	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1335–1510	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1738–1810	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
6 March	0925–1240	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1110–1200	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1125–1209	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1125–1232	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1435–1555	One UH-1H Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2320–0255	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
7 March	1008–1030	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1346–1403	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1527–1730	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1603–1716	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1752–1925	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1827–1915	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
8 March	1010–1645	One Cougar and one Huey Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1341–1435	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
9 March	1014–1127	One UH-1 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1038–1057	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1049–1110	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1219–1244	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1245–1300	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1500–1523	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1635–1642	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
11 March	1006–1027	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1135–1153	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
12 March	0952–1026	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1105–1250	One UH-1H Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1345–1410	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1422–1630	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
13 March	0924–1110	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1354–1429	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
15 March	0945–1327	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1030–1136	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1328–1340	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1622–1741	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
16 March	0910–1058	One Huey and one Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1410–1608	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1420–1438	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1709–1722	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
17 March	1009–1230	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
19 March	1040–1254	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1150–1232	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1208–1237	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1208–1246	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1403–1520	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1415–1514	Four F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1442–1516	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
20 March	1011–1120	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1510–1700	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1635–1710	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
21 March	1053–1205	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1310–1650	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1409–1513	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1547–1630	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
22 March	0812–0835	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0925–1002	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0959–1020	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1140–1345	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
23 March	1018–1222	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1203–1236	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1209–1234	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1406–1419	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1608–1722	One AS-532 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
24 March	0812–0904	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
25 March	1232–1340	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
26 March	0915–1004	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1317–1438	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1446–1452	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1502–1546	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1515–1521	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2002–2108	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
27 March	1919–2110	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
28 March	0959–1100	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1105–1124	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1417–1434	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
29 March	1015–1155	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1045–1306	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
30 March	1010–1234	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Annex II to the letter dated 8 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
1 March	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
1 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
1–2 March	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
1–2 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
3–5 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
3–9 March	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
6 March	One NL-123 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
8–9 March	One NL-123 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
8–9 March	One F-504 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
9–10 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
10–12 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
10–13 March	One F-512 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

Dates	*Nature of violation*
12–14 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
13–16 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
14–15 March	One F-504 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
14–16 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
14–17 March	One NL-123 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
16–19 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
19–20 March	One F-504 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
19–20 March	One P-334 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
20–21 March	One F-512 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
21–26 March	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
21–26 March	One F-244 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
22–31 March	One F-505 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
26 March	One F-505 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
26 March	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

Dates	*Nature of violation*
26–27 March	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
27–29 March	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
28–31 March	One A-580 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

United Nations A/72/893–S/2018/553

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
12 June 2018

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 7 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am transmitting herewith the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces along the State border of the Republic of Armenia during the month of May 2018 (see annex I).*

I am also transmitting herewith the record of the ceasefire violations by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh Republic) registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Artsakh during the month of May 2018 (see annex II).*

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mher **Margaryan**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.

18-09650 (E) 140618

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Annex I to the letter dated 7 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia, 1–31 May 2018

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 May	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**5**	Small arms and light weapons: 102
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 30
	Kolagir	1	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Geghamasar	1	
2 May	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**11**	Small arms and light weapons: 238
	Chinari	8	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 15
	Kutakan	1	
3 May	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**3**	Small arms and light weapons: 98
	Movses	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Geghamasar	1	
4 May	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	**6**	Small arms and light weapons: 43
	Chinari	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11
	Artanish	1	Grenade launchers: 3
	Vahan	1	
	Zangakatun	1	
5 May	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**4**	Small arms and light weapons: 31
	Kolagir	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 37
	Berkaber	1	
	Artanish	1	
	Vahan	1	
6 May	**Tavush region**	**2**	Small arms and light weapons: 17
	Aygepar	1	
	Voskevan	1	
7 May	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**3**	Small arms and light weapons: 65
	Movses	1	
	Kakhakan	1	
	Artanish	1	
8 May	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**3**	Small arms and light weapons: 43
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Aygedzor: 3; Geghamasar: 5)
	Aygedzor	1	
	Geghamasar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 50
9 May	**Tavush and Syunik regions**	**4**	Small arms and light weapons: 20
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 30
	Berkaber	1	
	Agarak	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
10 May	**Gegharkunik and Syunik regions**	**2**	**Small arms and light weapons: 23**
	Chambarak	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Arevis	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 55 (Chambarak)
11 May	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**6**	**Small arms and light weapons: 60**
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 67
	Berdavan	2	
	Kolagir	1	
	Tsapatagh	1	
	Jil	1	
12 May	**Tavush region**	**1**	**Small arms and light weapons: 7**
	Chinari	1	
13 May	**Tavush region**	**1**	**Large-calibre machine guns: 12**
	Barekamavan	1	
14 May	There were no shots		
15 May	**Tavush region**	**1**	**Small arms and light weapons: 1**
	Chinari	1	
16 May	**Tavush region**	**3**	**Small arms and light weapons: 20**
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 30
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
17 May	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**2**	**Small arms and light weapons: 43**
	Paravakar	1	
	Vahan	1	
18 May	**Tavush and Syunik regions**	**10**	**Small arms and light weapons: 204**
	Aygedzor	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 70
	Paravakar	4	
	Vazashen	1	
	Agarak	1	
19 May	**Tavush region**	**2**	**Large-calibre machine guns: 30**
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
20 May	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**3**	**Small arms and light weapons: 10**
	Aygedzor	1	
	Yeraskh	2	
21 May	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**2**	**Small arms and light weapons: 10**
	Kayan	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Zangakatun)
	Zangakatun	1	
22 May	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**8**	**Small arms and light weapons: 12**
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Berdavan	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 42 (Zangakatun)
	Yeraskh	2	Large-calibre machine gun: 100
	Zangakatun	4	
23 May	**Tavush, Gegharkunik, Vayots Dzor and Ararat regions**	**10**	**Small arms and light weapons: 94** **Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Paruyr Sevak)**
	Vazashen	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Barekamavan	1	
	Jivanavan	1	
	Bardzruni	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	4	
	Zangakatun	2	
24 May	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**2**	Small arms and light weapons: 15
	Baghanis	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20
	Avazan	1	
25 May	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**9**	Small arms and light weapons: 123
	Aygedzor	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 36
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 5
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	Artillery: 25
	Vazashen	2	
	Berdavan	1	
	Zangakatun	1	
26 May	**Tavush and Vayots Dzor regions**	**2**	Small arms and light weapons: 30
	Berdavan	1	
	Areni	1	
27 May	**Ararat region**	**3**	Small arms and light weapons: 102
	Zangakatun	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 90
			Large-calibre machine guns: 70
28 May	**Tavush, Vayots Dzor, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	**11**	Small arms and light weapons: 202
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Geghamasar)
	Kayan	2	
	Areni	1	
	Geghamasar	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
	Zangakatun	3	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
	Yelpin	1	
29 May	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Vayots Dzor regions**	**12**	Small arms and light weapons: 111
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 11
	Aygepar	2	
	Geghamasar	3	
	Areni	3	
	Chiva	2	
30 May	There were no shots		
31 May	**Tavush, Vayots Dzor and Ararat regions**	**8**	Small arms and light weapons: 59
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
	Movses	1	
	Dovegh	1	
	Baghanis	1	
	Khndzorut	1	
	Areni	2	
	Zangakatun	1	

Annex II to the letter dated 7 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh Republic), 1–31 May 2018

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	20	Small arms and light weapons: 123 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 23 (Jraberd)
2 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	15	Small arms and light weapons: 149 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Jraberd) Large-calibre machine guns: 5 Anti-aircraft systems: 1 (Marzili)
3 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 133 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
4 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 392 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11
5 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 696 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19
6 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	39	Small arms and light weapons: 801 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Ashagi Veysali: 10; Kengerli: 3; Verin Chaylu: 1)
7 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 139 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 28
8 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 331 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 23 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Mrov)
9 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	10	Small arms and light weapons: 55 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17
10 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 276 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17
11 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	12	Small arms and light weapons: 63 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Jraberd)
12 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	10	Small arms and light weapons: 69
13 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	13	Small arms and light weapons: 170
14 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 466 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11 Large-calibre machine guns: 10
15 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	25	Small arms and light weapons: 198 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Gjulistan) Large-calibre machine guns: 5

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
16 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 127 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Karakhanbeyli: 5; Kengerli: 6; Levonarkh: 3)
17 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	37	Small arms and light weapons: 263 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Kengerli)
18 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 198 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 22 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli: 17; Nuzger: 5)
19 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 321 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6 Grenade launchers: 6
20 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	8	Small arms and light weapons: 26 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
21 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	16	Small arms and light weapons: 370 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
22 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	10	Small arms and light weapons: 89 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9
23 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 179 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Kengerli)
24 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	16	Small arms and light weapons: 187 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Jraberd)
25 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	23	Small arms and light weapons: 197 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Kengerli: 5; Sarijanli: 2; Jraberd: 7)
26 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	13	Small arms and light weapons: 190 Large-calibre machine guns: 5
27 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	31	Small arms and light weapons: 276 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 31 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Jraberd)
28 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 188 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Kengerli)
29 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	31	Small arms and light weapons: 306 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 34 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Kengerli)
30 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 133 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Karakhanbeyli)
31 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	26	Small arms and light weapons: 306 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 12 (Kengerli)

During the reporting period, one soldier of the Defence Army of Artsakh was wounded by gunfire from the Azerbaijani side.

United Nations A/72/894–S/2018/559

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 72 (b)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 7 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a decision and a statement issued by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation concerning the attack carried out by the Ukrainian special services against the office of RIA Novosti-Ukraine (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 72 (b), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

18-10208 (E) 250618 020718

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 7 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Decision of the State Duma with respect to the statement issued by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation concerning the attack carried out by the Ukrainian special services against the office of RIA Novosti-Ukraine

The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation hereby decides:

1. To adopt the statement issued by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation concerning the attack carried out by the Ukrainian special services against the office of RIA Novosti-Ukraine.

2. To transmit the present decision and the aforementioned statement to the Government of the Russian Federation, the United Nations, the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, and the parliaments of the States members of the European Union.

3. To transmit the present decision and the aforementioned statement to the Parliamentary Gazette for official publication.

4. This decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

V. V. **Volodin**
Chairman of the State Duma
of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

Moscow, 17 May 2018
No. 3971-7 GD

Statement issued by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation concerning the attack carried out by the Ukrainian special services against the office of RIA Novosti-Ukraine

On 15 May 2018, officers of the Ukrainian Security Service raided the office of RIA Novosti-Ukraine and detained the journalist Kirill Vyshinsky.

Such actions by the authorities in Kiev against RIA Novosti-Ukraine and the employees working there are a blatant abuse of power by the Ukrainian special services. The use of force, which is usually applied to dangerous criminals, against journalists who are faithfully carrying out their work runs counter to fundamental European values. Freedom of expression and freedom of speech form an integral part of those values, as enshrined in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in other international legal obligations.

The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation calls on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe to take a principled stance with regard to the multiple violations of the rights of journalists in Ukraine, and demands the immediate release of Kirill Vyshinsky by the authorities in Kiev.

V. V. **Volodin**
Chairman of the State Duma
of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

Moscow, 17 May 2018

United Nations A/72/895–S/2018/558

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
13 June 2018

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda items 15, 19 and 40

Culture of peace

Sustainable development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 29 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to submit a statement (see annex) by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 15, 19 and 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-09757 (E) 250618

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 29 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic

On 28 May 1918, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic — the first democracy in the Muslim world — was founded. Despite serious internal and external challenges facing the country, the ADR succeeded in setting effective State institutions, upholding the rights and freedoms of its citizens and gaining the trust of the international community. State- and democracy-building became the cornerstone and legacy of the Azerbaijani statehood.

The road to State-building began with a Declaration of Independence that affirmed the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and guaranteed universal suffrage and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. Being a Muslim-majority country, Azerbaijan even surpassed the leading Western democracies in granting women the right to vote and hold office. The Government was formed on the basis of accountability and separation of powers. The democratically elected, multiparty and genuinely representative parliament of Azerbaijan has become the first of its kind in the entire Muslim Orient. In its two-year life, the Republic was governed by five executive cabinets, while the parliament held 155 meetings and discussed more than 240 legislations. Another vital pillar of the State-building process was the establishment of the Chamber of Appeals — a modern judicial system to check the legislative and executive powers.

The newly established Republic made education a primary objective. As a result of the consistent efforts to that end, the Baku State University was founded. Despite economic and political difficulties, Azerbaijan aspired for long-term human capital investment by providing scholarships for hundreds of young students to study in leading European universities. Azerbaijani was declared the official language, the national tricolour flag and anthem were adopted, a modern theatre and opera were established, Azerbaijani postage stamps were printed and national currency — manat — was issued.

Diplomatic activities within the Republic took place even before gaining independence. The leading political figures applied their first-hand diplomatic experiences within the Transcaucasian Commission and subsequently became the advocates and promoters of Azerbaijan's interests abroad. The most important foreign policy objective for the Republic was to attain international recognition and to establish diplomatic ties at a time when war-torn Europe and new international order were being formed.

Just two days after declaring independence, the newly formed Government of the ADR sent an official statement on proclamation of Azerbaijan's independence to the main world political centres. A week later, Azerbaijan signed its first friendship treaty with Turkey.

The visit to Paris of the parliamentary delegation of Azerbaijan, headed by Mr. Alimardan Topchubashov, to gain international recognition for the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was the first major breakthrough in diplomatic relations. The members of the delegation to the Paris Peace Conference impressed foreign dignitaries by their ideas of liberty, rights and justice. Unanimous de facto recognition

of Azerbaijan was attained in January 1920 and its mission received an invitation to the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference.

At the same time, the Government had undertaken efforts towards building a competent diplomatic corps, as well as sending and receiving missions.

To counter unwarranted propaganda by Armenian nationalistic circles, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the ADR had established contacts and dialogue with peoples throughout the world. As the Caucasus was a territory largely unknown to Western public, the Armenian side launched a wide campaign based on historic deceptions to mask their territorial claims to neighbouring countries. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic also developed close ties with Azerbaijanis living abroad, effectively giving rise to the concept we now call Motherland — Diaspora relations.

In April 1919, the Allied Powers recognized the provisional General-Governorship of Karabakh, which was established by the ADR in January 1919 and included Shusha, Javanshir, Jabrayil and Zangazur provinces, with the centre in Shusha town, to be under Azerbaijani jurisdiction, and Mr. Khosrov bay Sultanov as its Governor.

In 1919, diplomatic missions of 16 States had functioned in Baku, including Belgium, France, Iran, Italy, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the USA.

However, the Bolsheviks' invasion in April 1920 put an end to the independence of the ADR. Despite serious resistance to the Bolsheviks in many parts of the country and continued efforts of the Azerbaijani delegation at the Paris Peace Conference to achieve de jure recognition and admission to the League of Nations, Soviet rule was established in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan restored its independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the USSR left Azerbaijan in deep economic crisis, dysfunctional State institutions and internal instability. Taking advantage of the situation, Armenia launched large-scale military operations on the territory of Azerbaijan to realize its groundless annexationist claims. The Armenian aggression resulted in ethnic cleansing and occupation of twenty per cent of the territory of Azerbaijan and made more than 1 million Azerbaijanis internally displaced or refugees.

The recovery and reforms process in the country had started only after 1993. Despite serious domestic problems and external pressures, national leader Mr. Heydar Aliyev managed to place Azerbaijan on a strategic path aimed at preserving the sovereignty of our country and achieving economic growth, paving the way for long-term sustainable development. Public institutions were reinstated and the first national Constitution in the history of Azerbaijan was adopted.

What had lacked in 1918 — a stable and growing economy — Azerbaijan achieved once it restored its independence in 1991. The Contract of the Century, signed in 1994, introduced a flow of investments into Azerbaijan's oil and gas sector and had remarkable multiplying effects for the economy and society. This milestone event ensured a breakthrough in oil diplomacy and can be considered as a turning point for national recovery.

The promotion of good governance and successful economic policy laid the foundation for gradual overcoming of socioeconomic problems, generating high economic performance and growth, ensuring better living standards, health care and overall prosperity.

Regrettably, while Azerbaijan has flourished in progress and well-being, twenty per cent of our territory — the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven

surrounding districts — remain occupied and viciously exploited by the Republic of Armenia. The continuing Armenian aggression prevents hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis from returning to their homes and properties in safety and dignity. Therefore, the restoration of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is the number one priority of our foreign policy. We will continue working with our partners and global and regional international organizations with a view to mobilizing support for the just and lasting settlement of the conflict within the territorial integrity and internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan. However, the success of the peace process depends on a constructive approach and faithful observance of international law on the part of Armenia, as well as on the active contribution of the international community.

In just two decades, Azerbaijan has risen to become a reliable international partner, in both political and economic dimensions. Rooted in transparency and predictability, Azerbaijan's foreign policy attracts mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral relations with both regional and global powers. Encouraged by the successful implementation of oil, gas and transportation projects, such as the construction and operationalization of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines, as well as the Baku-Tbilisi-Qars railway and East-West Trans-Caspian route, Azerbaijan is increasingly viewed as a pivotal player in the region and an important actor in the international arena as an energy producer, exporter and transit country. Azerbaijan's strategic geographic location at the intersection of the major trade routes along the East-West and North-South transport and energy corridors provides an important asset to turn the country into an energy, transport and infrastructure hub.

A highly ambitious initiative on Azerbaijan's part has been the construction of the Southern Gas Corridor. In June 2018, we will be marking the inauguration of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, the largest portion of the Southern Gas Corridor. We look forward to operationalizing the Trans-Adriatic pipeline by next year. A key objective of these gas pipeline projects is to address Europe's energy security concerns. Once the Southern Gas Corridor is completed, gas produced from the Caspian field will be transported through the territories of Georgia, Turkey, Greece and Albania into Italy, and from where it will be distributed throughout Europe. The Southern Gas Corridor is one of the global oil and gas industry's most significant and ambitious undertakings, which has proved to be vital in developing partnerships between Azerbaijan and Europe.

Azerbaijan's role as a natural bridge between East and West creates opportunities not only in providing transport routes, but also in connecting peoples and ideas from all over the world and overcoming prejudice and intolerance. Situated on the historical crossroads between East and West, Azerbaijan has absorbed the values of both civilizations and cultures.

The idea of independence inspired by the founders of the ADR has never been forgotten. The policy pursued later by the national leader, Mr. Heydar Aliyev, strengthened and further developed the sense of national identity by reviving our deep historical and cultural memory and instilling a firm conviction in us — modern Azerbaijanis — to preserve and safeguard our independence and statehood. Treasuring Mr. Heydar Aliyev's statehood policy, the people of Azerbaijan celebrates this year the 28th of May — Republic Day — with the sense of high pride and spiritual rise. The proclamation of 2018 as the year of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, as well as the Decree by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Mr. Ilham Aliyev, to ensure due commemoration of the centennial of the ADR, are vivid manifestations of the aforementioned.

Looking ahead, for us it is imperative to continue our path of conducting independent foreign policy based on proactive strategy aimed at realizing what was bequeathed by the founders of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic — defending and promoting the national interests of the Republic of Azerbaijan, strengthening the country's independence and sovereignty.